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ABSTRACT 
Research has shown that individuals can be persuaded of a message in two ways: using a central 
(rational) approach, or through a peripheral (more “irrational”) approach in which irrelevant 
signals are seen as convincing. In addition, it is suggested that recent negative experiences cause 
individuals to favor the central route, whereas individuals in positive moods rely more heavily on 
the peripheral route. I extend these findings to the realm of financial advertising by presenting a 
simple model predicting that mutual funds will use more economically rational arguments when 
stock market returns have been low, and will cater to irrational inclinations when returns have 
been high. These predictions are supported by two case studies of print advertisements in Money 
and the Journal of Financial Planning from the period January 2003 to March 2009. 
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I. Introduction 
 In 1996 Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, famously warned that irrational 
exuberance was causing people to overvalue assets and spend carelessly in the marketplace. 
What made such behavior notable was that it deviated from the both the ideal and the “normal” 
investing mentality. The ideal mentality, as will be shown, is a rational, calculated approach to 
consumption, but the normal mentality is less clearly defined. In this paper, I present a model 
that suggests that most people fluctuate systematically between highs of irrational exuberance 
and lows involving a far more rational and calculated analysis of products to be consumed. The 
mediating factors in this pattern are both advertising and prior experiences. 
 Virtually none today are immune from the tremendous impact of advertising, so it may 
seem almost paradoxical that economists have not devoted more resources to accurately 
capturing this mechanism. Advertising has been credited with influencing the preferences and, in 
turn, the consumption patterns of members of modern societies (e.g., Galbraith 1958), but its 
traditional definition within economics is “the provision of information on the availability and 
quality of a commodity” (Stigler 1987, p. 243). Under this model, investors are assumed to act in 
a Bayesian fashion, using the information from advertisements in order to update their prior 
beliefs about a product and make a rational decision about whether or not to buy the good (Karni 
2007). This may very well depict the ideal approach toward investing, but, as Greenspan 
indicated, investors may deviate from this method on occasion. 
Economists favoring a more behavioral model of advertising, by contrast, attempt to 
identify the normal approach toward investing. Such models acknowledge that advertisers 
persuade customers to buy a product by attempting to incorporate the product’s characteristics 
into the customers’ dominant belief systems (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2006). This can be done 
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by sending factual messages, or even less than authentic ones, that take advantage of consumers’ 
pre-existing—though not necessarily accurate—beliefs.  
 Models proposed from this behavioral perspective might be enhanced by the findings in 
psychology which suggest two mechanisms that shift individuals toward a more rational method 
of decision-making: mood and learning. A number of psychological studies have shown that 
individuals who are in bad moods evaluate persuasive messages in a more “rational” fashion (e.g. 
Bless 1990). For investors, this may occur following a period of disappointing market returns. 
This is consistent with the finding that individuals learn from negative financial experiences, 
causing them to evaluate future financial decisions more rationally (Agarwal et al. 2008). 
Research has further shown that people in good moods can be swayed more easily by 
uninformative or “irrational” messages. This may be prompted by a period of high market 
returns, contributing to the effect which Greenspan described.   
My aim in this paper is to extend the economics literature on advertising by examining 
whether periods of low market returns produce more advertisements consistent with the 
traditional theory of economics, and whether the contrary is true during bull markets. In order to 
address this question, I will be analyzing over one thousand mutual fund advertisements from 
Money and The Journal of Financial Planning over the period from January 2003 to March 2009, 
which roughly encompasses the last stock market cycle to date. In the next section of this paper, 
I will briefly review the relevant literature on advertising, mutual funds, and consumer behavior 
from economics, finance and psychology. Section III will contain a description of the proposed 
model of Ir/Rational Exuberance as well as my hypotheses. Section IV will contain a case study 
examining data from Money magazine and Section V will analyze advertisements from the 
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Journal of Financial Planning. The paper will conclude in Section VI with a summary of the 
findings and their implications. 
II. Background 
The traditional economic model of advertising is based on the assumption that economic 
operators are rational, utility-maximizing agents (Stigler 1961). Such beings are expected to 
behave in a Bayesian fashion with initial (or prior) beliefs about products that are then rationally 
updated in light of new information in order to form posterior beliefs about the products (Karni 
2007). Within this framework, the raison d’être of advertising is to transmit information about a 
given product. Potential consumers will then rationally evaluate this information and use it to 
determine whether or not they will consume the product in question (Mullainathan and Shleifer 
2006). This model implies both that advertisers will attempt to inform consumers to the fullest 
extent possible, and that consumers are sophisticated enough at maximizing their own utility to 
properly interpret the messages presented. Under this model, the absence of certain potentially 
useful information will be interpreted as a scheme to disguise the product’s weakness in that 
particular area (Akerlof 1970, Grossman and Hart 1980, Mullainathan and Shleifer 2006). For 
example, if consumers believe past mutual fund returns to be informative and a particular fund 
does not list its prior returns, consumers will infer that the information was omitted because the 
fund performed poorly. The advantages of this traditional framework include its theoretical 
simplicity; however, it has come under greater scrutiny in recent years for its divergence from 
empirical observations. 
Empirical findings that contradict this traditional model of advertising can be divided into 
two subject areas: the manner in which mutual funds actually advertise, and the way these 
messages are interpreted by investors. A number of researchers (e.g. Resnick and Stern, 1977; 
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Cronqvist, 2005) have argued that financial advertising is inconsistent with traditional model of 
what rational investors need, and that mutual fund advertising in particular has a history of 
misleading investors (Swensen, 2005). With regard to investor reactions, other researchers have 
observed patterns of trend-chasing, in which investment styles that have done well in the recent 
past are favored for future investments (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; DeLong et al., 
1990). Similarly, there is empirical support for the argument that investors tend to extrapolate 
past returns to the future by investing in funds that have recently had high returns (Barberis and 
Shleifer, 2003; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Despite 
these inconsistencies with the traditional model, mutual fund advertising is remarkably effective 
(Cooper, Gulen and Rau, 2005; Jain and Wu, 2000). Accordingly, I will assume that mutual 
funds know the forms of advertising that are most successful on their target consumers. I ignore 
the possibility that mutual funds are themselves susceptible to herd behavior or other biases that 
may distort their choice of message. 
A number of behavioral models have emerged in recent years as economists attempt to 
shrink the gulf between the theoretical and the empirical by relying more heavily on empirical 
observations. These behavioral models relax the assumption of rationality and examine the 
effects of consumers’ cognitive and emotional responses to the data they encounter (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1982). For our purposes, these models can be divided into roughly three categories: 
those that incorporate advertising into the utility function, those that examine the transmission of 
information, and those that deal primarily with consumers’ cognition.  
The relationship in terms of utility between advertising and goods was first put forth by 
Stigler and Becker (1977). In their model, advertising was incorporated into consumers’ utility 
functions and it further was recognized as a means through which advertisers can take advantage 
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of consumers’ imperfect information in order to differentiate and promote their own products 
even in perfectly competitive markets. This model was then extended by Becker and Murphy 
(1993) who argued that advertising and goods advertised can be treated as complements in 
metautility functions. This was further refined by Laibson (2001), in which advertising was 
presented as an environmental cue that can alter the marginal utility of consumption. 
Other models have placed greater emphasis on the manner in which advertising transmits 
information and its content. Crawford and Sobel (1982) describe a model of strategic information 
transmission which can be applied to advertising such that one party (e.g. the advertiser) sends a 
noisy signal which is interpreted by a second party (the consumer) who then makes a decision 
that impacts the welfare of both parties. Nelson (1974) also argued in favor of expanding what 
information can be considered informative to account, among other things, for misleading 
advertising. 
Finally, a number of more recent models, including the one presented in the present paper, 
examine advertising in terms of cognition. Gabaix and Laibson (2005) present a model of limited 
cognition in which firms can choose either to educate consumers about their products in the case 
of information asymmetry, or to exploit the asymmetry by shrouding pertinent details (e.g. cost, 
add-ons, etc.) if education is unlikely to persuade consumers to buy the product. Mullainathan, 
Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2008), the theoretical basis for this model, examine consumer 
cognition in terms of beliefs. They argue that consumers of financial products hold one of two 
beliefs about investing: growth (investment as a means to become rich) or protection (investment 
as a means to secure the future). These beliefs vary in prominence as a result of on economic 
events, such as stock market performance, which then causes advertisers to vary the messages 
they transmit so that they are in accordance with the prevailing beliefs of the time.  
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My research is related to the cognitive category of models in two regards. First, I accept 
that funds tailor their messages in order to make the product look as favorable as possible in light 
of investors’ prevailing beliefs. Secondly, I assume that investors’ beliefs are not constant. 
Where my work is unique, though, is in its analysis of both how and why investor beliefs tend to 
differ. More specifically, I am proposing that consumers become more rational during bear 
markets and less rational during bull markets as a result of both mood and learning. In the 
following paragraphs, I will review the literature on both of these topics.  
There exists a substantial body of psychological literature examining the effects of mood 
on persuasion, but the majority of this work involves the elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion. This model holds that individuals persuaded in one of two ways: through the central 
route to persuasion, in which individuals mentally elaborate on the content of the message, or 
through the peripheral route to persuasion, in which individuals are swayed by cues that are 
unrelated to the message, such as the prestige or likeableness of the persuader (Petty and 
Caccioppo 1986a, 1986b). This paper argues that mutual funds target investors’ central routes to 
persuasion when market returns have been low and exploit the peripheral routes to persuasion 
when the market has performed well as a whole. This argument rests on both psychological 
research about mood and persuasion, as well as financial research on learning.  
A number of researchers have found that people in bad moods will prefer a central route 
to persuasion, which may be due to their desire to concentrate on any task other than what is 
causing their bad moods, while those in good moods will rely on more heuristic means of 
drawing conclusions in order to maintain their moods, which favors the peripheral route to 
persuasion (e.g., Fiedler 1988; Rosenbaum 1980; Schwarz 2001). This evidence is, however, 
tempered by data showing that depressives have less motivation (Peterson & Seligman 1984) 
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which suggests that if a bad mood goes unchecked it will adversely affect one’s ability to engage 
in controlled reasoning. When the above psychological findings are applied to advertising, one 
finds that stronger, more logical arguments are needed to persuade individuals who are in a bad 
mood (e.g., Bless et al. 1990, 1992; Mackie & Worth 1989; Schwarz & Bless 1991; Schwarz et 
al. in press; Worth & Mackie 1987).  I will build on these findings by arguing that mutual funds 
present more rational arguments (i.e. target the central route) when investors are presumed to be 
in bad moods, and engage in more extraneous signaling (using the peripheral route) in order to 
attract investors win good moods. 
As I am proposing that investors tend to be in bad moods during bear markets and in 
good moods during bull markets, it is necessary to review some findings on mood and the 
economy. Catalano and Dooley (1977), for example, find that a large proportion of the variation 
in mood can be explained by the change in economic conditions (primarily unemployment) over 
the past one to three months. In addition, Catalano (1991) reviews the body of research that links 
economic instability with increased levels of suicide, psychological counseling, and stress. These 
findings are supported by Gallup Data relating the current economic crisis to lower personal 
satisfaction (Jones 2008), less happiness and more stress (Arora and Harter 2008) as well as 
increased suffering (Arora and Harter 2009).  
There remains one more possible explanation for the shift toward rationality during bear 
markets, and that is learning. Some research has documented other forms of financial learning, as 
in the credit card market, where individuals evaluate cards’ fee structures more rationally after 
having to pay a late fee, but, importantly, this knowledge depreciates over time (Agarwal et al. 
2008). There also appears to be support for the idea that economic difficulty prompts individuals 
to become more frugal, and thus evaluate future purchases more carefully (Evans 2009). My 
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research will not attempt to separate whether the observed changes in behavior are the result of 
mood changes or learning, as both causes will produce the same observable effects in investor 
behavior and financial advertisements. Thus, it appears highly plausible that the negative 
experience of losing money in the stock market will cause individuals to evaluate future 
investments more carefully in the short run, resulting in mindsets that alternate between 
rationality and irrationality more or less in tandem with the business cycle.  
III. Model of Ir/Rational Exuberance 
 I will now present a simple model that modifies one developed by Mullainathan and 
Shleifer (2006) in order to capture the phenomena described above. In their paper, Mullainathan 
and Shleifer argued that investors’ attitudes toward investing fluctuated in response to market 
returns. When market returns were high, investment was seen as a means to make money, 
whereas, when market returns were low, investment was regarded as a way to secure the future. I 
am not so much concerned with investors’ attitudes toward investment as with the way investors 
evaluate advertisements. That is, whether they process persuasive messages more by central or 
peripheral routes. Thus, the distinction between this model and Mullainathan and Shleifer’s is its 
emphasis on identify the cognitive mechanisms that produce different patterns of investor 
behavior, rather than purely characterizing the observable behaviors themselves. 
Proposed Model 
 Let us begin with a simple utility function, U(C, r) = r – C, in which r represents the 
excess returns from holding a particular mutual fund and C represents all costs associated with 
holding the fund, including the excess risk undertaken to achieve these returns. In order to 
maximize utility, investors will attempt to maximize the difference between returns and costs. At 
any particular point in time, the investor perceives the relationship between costs and returns to 
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be r = v*C, in which v > 0 represents the investor’s evaluation of how “easy” it is to earn excess 
returns.  
 Let v(c, p, δ) = [
p
/c]*δ. This indicates that the investor’s evaluation of a particular 
message is a function of both the central (c) and peripheral (p) routes to persuasion and a 
measure of individual differences, δ > 0. This last term, δ, reflects an individual’s propensity to 
favor central versus peripheral signals, and the extent to which his or her preferences of either of 
these signals is resistant to change. Those with a lower value for δ prefer central (or rational) 
decision-making, whereas individuals with a higher δ will tend to favor peripheral (irrational) 
messages. If δ = 1, then the individual has no preference for peripheral or central cues, and 
merely responds to the ones that are relevant to him or her at that particular moment.   
 Crucially, v fluctuates according to the investor’s recent experiences. When recent 
experiences have been unpleasant, v will be low, causing individuals to rely more heavily on 
centrally persuasive messages as a result of a negative mood and the effects of learning. If this is 
the case, investors will make more economically rational decisions in their attempts to achieve 
utility by maximizing returns and minimizing costs. When v is high, recent experiences have 
been positive, causing investors to be in good moods and thus evaluate peripheral signals more 
favorably. This state prompts investors to make less rational decisions and can result in an 
improper evaluation of the gap between returns and costs. 
 As in Mullainathan and Shleifer’s model, I assume that advertisers do not attempt to 
change investor beliefs or the manner in which investors evaluate funds. Rather, firms accept 
these evaluations as exogenous, and adjust their own advertising signals in such a way that 
allows them to maximize profit. Any advertising message a firm sends will consist of two parts: 
a message about costs and a message about returns. Since firms can send a message in which the 
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dimension on costs or returns is equal to zero, the full set of messages, M, that can be sent looks 
as follows:  
    (mc, mr)  
      M =  (mr) 
       (mc) 
 
I will also assume that the signal that can be sent about returns will be related to the firm’s past 
returns, which is supported by financial literature showing that investors tend to extrapolate 
returns. The signal about costs will identify fees and expenses, in addition to signals about risk, 
which can be inferred from cues about the quality of the fund manager and investment team.  
  As stated above, investors assess the potential utility of investing with a fund using v, 
their central and peripheral means of processing. Accordingly, the following two assumptions 
laid out by Mullainathan and Shleifer will hold. First, firms will send messages that maximize 
investors’ perceived utility in order to be able to charge the highest price possible for the product 
being sold. Second, investors will take these advertising messages at face value. I further assume 
that investors are generally risk-averse, and find lower excess risk to be more desirable.  
 Firms, then, have several options about what sort of messages to send. First, they may 
choose to send a message only about return, which the investor will observe as r = mr. The 
investor will then infer that C = (mr)/(v), yielding the utility function, U = mr*[1 – 
1
/v]. 
Alternatively, firms can send a message only about costs. This will be read as C = mC. Again, the 
investor will use this to deduce that r = v*mC, and U= mC*[v – 1]. Lastly, firms can send a signal 
about both costs and returns. In this case, one can assume a parameter b, where 0 < b < 1, that 
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captures the extent to which an individual weights messages about returns over messages about 
costs. This will result in the following observations of returns and costs: 
r = bmr + (1-b)vmC 
C = b(mr/v) + (1-b)mC 
The weights are the same in the calculations of r and c because the equilibrium condition r = vC 
must hold. As b approaches 1, the return signal is preferred, but as b approaches 0, the message 
about costs dominates. If mr=vmC, then the signal lies on v, the line of evaluation. Then the same 
effect is achieved regardless of the value of b, such that r = mr and C = mC, which implies that 
the individual takes the given message as his forecast. 
 In light of these assumptions, it is clear that firms can attain the highest investor utility 
by sending a pure return or pure cost message. This is the case because the utility reached with a 
mixed message is the weighted average of the utilities under pure messages, with weights 
determined by b. That is: U(mr, mC) = bU(mr) + (1-b)U(mC). Thus, the firm will prefer 
whichever of the terms, mr or mC, produces a higher utility over a combination of the two.  
 This illustrates that there are effectively two regimes of investor sentiment to which 
firms must cater. When v < 1, which implies p < c, it is in the firm’s best interests to send a 
message about costs. More specifically, the firms’ optimal message is mC = 0. This follows 
logically, as a cost is a bad, meaning that firms will want to send a message stating that the costs 
of doing business with them are as low as possible. I assume, further, that this will tend to occur 
after a negative experience, such as a period of poor market performance. Likewise, when v > 1, 
then p > c and the firm is best off by sending a message about returns, mr. I assume this to be the 
case after the market as a whole has performed well and investors are generally in positive 
moods. These propositions are depicted in graphs 1 and 2.   
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Graph 1: Returns message is optimal when v > 1 
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Graph 2: Costs message is optimal when v < 1 
C 
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The predictions that firms will send a pure cost or pure returns message are somewhat 
extreme and depend on investors having a linear utility function. A more general utility function 
would allow for firms sending mixed messages, although this does not discount the possibility 
that firms may still find it in their best interests to send a pure message when investor sentiment 
is clearly optimistic or pessimistic. Even under a general utility function, though, a shift in 
investor attitudes from pessimistic to optimistic will prompt firms to emphasize returns over 
costs and vice versa, which is clearly captured in the utility function presented here.  
Hypotheses 
 This model produces several testable predictions about mutual fund advertisements. 
First, when v is low and the “rational” framework prevails as a result of negative past 
experiences, funds should advertise information about their fees and expenses, as suggested by 
Stigler. Second, funds should avoid presenting information about returns as past performance is 
not indicative of future performance. Should a fund choose to advertise returns, it should only 
present relative returns, as these are more likely to be informative for those assessing underlying 
fund manager quality. Similarly, firms may choose to report Morningstar or Lipper ratings as 
these represent a fund’s performance relative to its peer group. Under the traditional model of 
advertising, these traits would be insensitive to fluctuations in stock performance; however, in 
the Ir/Rational Exuberance model, I predict that these qualities will only be present when 
investors’ overall mood is negative, which will occur when the market as a whole is performing 
poorly. 
 When the stock market is performing well, investors’ moods become more positive and 
the irrational model comes into play. Here, individuals are not engaged in deep mental 
processing about the best ways to make money, causing data on fees and expenses to be 
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overlooked. Accordingly, firms will choose not to represent this information. Information about 
returns, though, is a strong peripheral cue that the fund will allow investments to grow. This 
model predicts that firms will be more likely to advertise returns during this time. Furthermore, 
since individuals are not critically assessing underlying fund manager quality, absolute returns 
will be preferred to relative. Finally, Morningstar and Lipper ratings, which describe relative 
returns, will be useful only to the extent that they signal the prestige of a fund—as the relative 
strength of a fund will not be critically assessed. Thus, firms will be indifferent between 
advertising these rankings and their own returns. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of Predictions by Ir/Rational Exuberance Model 
 Category Irrational Rational 
Returns Advertise Omit 
Type Favored Absolute Relative 
Expenses Omit Advertise 
Ratings Indifferent Advertise 
 In addition, I expect that certain groups of individuals will have lower values of δ than 
others, making them predisposed to favor the central route to persuasion. More specifically, 
sophisticated investors will make investment decisions more rationally than will casual investors, 
irrespective of recent stock market performance because their δ parameter is relatively low. In 
the following paragraphs I will describe two cases in which I empirically test these predictions 
using mutual fund advertisements from Money and the Journal of Financial Planning. 
IV. Case I: Money Magazine 
Methodology 
In order to examine the first hypothesis, that casual investors prefer a rational (irrational) 
approach during bear (bull) markets, I have compiled a data set of mutual fund advertisements 
from Money magazine. This is a monthly magazine which was examined by Mullainathan and 
Shleifer (2006) over the years 1994-2003 in order to understand the manner in which mutual 
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funds targeted investors before, during and after the internet stock bubble. In this paper I am 
examining all mutual fund advertisements from the period January 2003 to March 2009. With 
these advertisements, I will be testing whether the traits of mutual fund advertising change 
systematically over time as predicted by the Ir/Rational model.   
Following Mullainathan and Shleifer’s approach, I copied and dated the financial 
advertisements in each issue. In addition to the name of the advertiser, I recorded whether mutual 
funds were explicitly mentioned, or whether a company that is known to offer mutual funds 
advertised an unrelated service, for example brokerage services or investment advice. For 
advertisements explicitly referring to mutual funds, I collected data on whether the advertisement 
mentions past returns, whether these are absolute or relative returns, and whether the 
advertisement mentions the fund’s Morningstar or Lipper ratings. I also recorded whether these 
were stock, bond or mixed funds, and if they were stock funds, what their investment style was 
(i.e. growth, value, blend, or index). Aside from these basic features, I did not keep track of the 
content of particular advertisements. The following calculations will show only the 556 
advertisements from this period that explicitly mentioned mutual funds.  
Data and Results 
Once the data was collected, advertisement traits were aggregated into quarterly series. 
As Mullainathan and Shleifer found that a rolling one quarter lag with the S&P 500 was highly 
predictive of the share of mutual fund ads with returns in all mutual fund ads, I obtained the 
correlation between my quarterly series and the one quarter lagged S&P 500 returns. I then 
compared these results with Mullainathan and Shleifer’s findings, as shown in Table 2. Table 2 
also includes Mullainathan and Shleifer’s findings from Business Week. 
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Table 2: Comparison of own findings with Mullainathan and Shleifer’s 
Trait 
Batra 
Money 
M&S 
Money 
M&S 
Business 
Week 
Total Number of Advertisements 556 4971 1469  
Time Period Observed 
1/03-
3/09 
1/94-
12/03 
1/94-
12/03 
Returns 
Percentage of Ads with Returns 39.21% 60.30% 48.40% 
Correlation with S&P 500 (1Q lag) 0.49 0.489 0.619  
Ratings 
Percentage of Ads with Ratings 28.60% 17.00% 7%  
Correlation with S&P 500 0.34 0.646 0.123  
 
 While some of the relationships described above seem to be stable, such as the 
correlation between share of advertisements with returns and the S&P 500, there are also a 
number of key differences between my findings and those of Mullainathan and Shleifer. The first 
of these differences is that the number of advertisements seems to have dropped considerably. 
Mullainathan and Shleifer examined Money ads over a period that was roughly twice as long as 
the one I looked at, but they recorded nearly ten times as many advertisements as I did. This 
raises the question of whether print advertising is becoming somewhat obsolete. Reliance on the 
internet as a means of doing research has certainly increased in recent years (e.g. Parasuraman 
and Zinkhan 2002), and this may be reflected in both fewer print advertisements as well as 
possible differences between the way in which print advertisements are used by firms that choose 
to employ this strategy. This speculation is tempered slightly by the fact that I found a 0.66 
correlation between the number of advertisements in Money and S&P 500 returns, which 
suggests that I also found fewer advertisements because a larger proportion of my data set 
coincided with a stock market contraction.  
Another striking difference is that the share of funds choosing to advertise returns has 
dropped by eleven percent. While I could not test whether this was significant because I was 
 19 
unable to access Mullainathan and Shleifer’s data, this appears to be a considerable reduction. It 
may be the case that more people are now inclined to do internet research before making such an 
important purchase as a mutual fund (e.g., Bakos 1998), causing firms to treat print advertising 
as a means of luring individuals to their websites, where such information as past returns can be 
obtained. Firms that did choose to advertise past returns, whether absolute or relative, did so in a 
manner that had a nearly identical correlation to the S&P 500 as Mullainathan and Shleifer found. 
The final point of comparison I would like to highlight between the two is the considerably 
smaller correlation I found for the share of advertisements containing reference to Morningstar 
and Lipper rankings, while the share of advertisements falling in this category increased during 
the period I studied. It is somewhat unclear what these differences indicate, although it seems 
plausible that consumers’ preferences have evolved over the past fifteen years and firms have 
adjusted their advertisements accordingly. 
 Now I will return to the hypotheses listed in Section III. The data for these traits are 
presented in Table 3. Above, I had predicted that when stock market returns are high, the 
irrational attitude will prevail, resulting in mutual funds advertising past returns, favoring 
absolute returns over relative returns, omitting information about expenses, and being indifferent 
to publicizing Morningstar and Lipper ratings. When the market is low, advertisements should 
omit past returns, but if returns are included then these should be relative returns, while also 
advertising information about expenses and ratings.  
Table 3: Summary of Findings from Money Magazine 
Returns Ratings 
Share of Ads with Returns 39.21% Share of Ads with Ratings 28.60% 
Correlation with S&P 500 0.49*** Correlation with S&P 500 0.34*** 
Relative vs. Absolute Returns Expenses 
Share of Ads with Absolute 46.33% Share of Ads with Expenses 43.53% 
Correlation with S&P 500 0.44*** Correlation with S&P 500 -0.56*** 
Share of Ads with Relative 53.67% 
Correlation with S&P 500 -0.338*** ***= p<.0001, two-tailed 
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The data seem to be supportive of these predictions, as the correlation coefficient on 
advertising returns is positive and strong, indicating that firms will only present returns when the 
market as a whole has performed well. In addition, the correlation coefficient on absolute returns 
is positive and high, which suggests that these are only presented when the irrational belief set is 
dominant. The coefficient on relative returns is negative, which would indicate that relative 
returns are more common in advertisements when stock market returns have been low. It should 
also be noted that the share of advertisements presenting either absolute or relative returns was 
calculated in relation to only those advertisements containing reference to returns—not to all 
mutual fund advertisements in the sample. 
Surprisingly, I found a correlation coefficient for ratings that was positive and moderate, 
which would mean that firms tend to advertise ratings more often when market returns have been 
high. This is not consistent with what was predicted. It seems reasonable, though, that if more 
firms on average are presenting returns during periods of high stock market performance, then 
funds that have had especially high returns would want to illustrate this fact and thus decide to 
highlight any awards received for strong past performance. Finally, there is a strong negative 
correlation coefficient on expenses, which provides support for the theory of a dominant rational 
model during down markets. All correlations discussed were of quarterly series of 
advertisements and S&P 500 returns, and were significant at the .0001 level, two-tailed.  
Discussion 
 In the above example, advertisements from Money magazine were analyzed in order to 
see whether mutual fund advertisements from January 2003 to March 2009 are consistent with a 
model in which firms cater to an “irrational” attitude in casual investors during bull markets 
through the use of peripheral cues and a “rational” one when the market is down by means of 
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centrally-oriented messages. The data seem to be largely supportive of this theory, though they 
raise a few questions in turn. The first of these questions is why advertising has slipped over the 
past six years and whether this means that print advertisements serve a different purpose now 
than they did before the internet became widely accessible to the public. Related to this question 
are the issues of why fewer advertisements refer to past returns and why more advertisements 
refer to Morningstar and Lipper ratings. Do these changes signify a broader shift in consumer 
attitudes toward the types of details that are considered informative? Or, as was mentioned 
earlier, are firms now using advertisements as a means of encouraging individuals to research 
their websites and thereby altering the information included in a systematically different way 
than in prior decades? Future research should address these questions. In addition, it is important 
to expand the data set to encompass both more years and different magazines, in order to verify 
the strength of these findings and discount the possibility that this pattern is simply a finding 
peculiar to Money magazine during the real estate bubble.  
V. Case II: Journal of Financial Planning 
In the previous case, advertisements targeting the casual investor were examined. What 
happens, though, when mutual funds are targeting a more sophisticated consumer, such as one 
who manages money professionally? This question will be addressed in the present case, by 
examining advertisements from the Journal of Financial Planning (JFP). This is a monthly 
magazine which circulates to certified financial planners, including all members of the Financial 
Planning Association. According to the website, the average reader of this magazine is “a 51-
year-old male financial planner with 16 years of experience in the financial services industry 
who works for an independent RIA [Registered Investment Advisor].” Such individuals are 
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assumed to have a lower value for δ, biasing them toward more rational decision making 
irrespective of recent experiences.  
The mechanism of advertising will be slightly different for financial advisors, as funds 
are no longer directly targeting potential investors, but rather a middle man who is responsible 
for someone else’s investments. Thus, I would expect the combination of the advisor’s financial 
expertise and emotional detachment will result in decisions that are overwhelmingly “rational,” 
and generally conform to the traditional economic theory. More specifically, my hypothesis is 
that funds will avoid advertising returns, though they will include relative returns if any returns 
are to be mentioned; in addition, funds will advertise Morningstar and Lipper ratings. There is 
one divergence in this particular example from the traditional theory, and that is with regard to 
expenses. While the traditional model would support advertising expenses, firms will not include 
this information in advertisements to financial planners, as the fee and expense structure the 
investor faces will be unique to his or her particular arrangement with the financial planner. Thus, 
funds will omit expense data in this magazine. Finally, these findings will be relatively 
insensitive to market fluctuations. 
Methodology 
In order to examine this hypothesis, I have compiled a data set of mutual fund 
advertisements from all issues during the period January 2003 to March 2009, with the exception 
of February 2006, which was not available in either the Boston College or Boston Public library. 
As above, I copied and dated the financial advertisements in each issue, keeping record of the 
name of the advertiser, whether mutual funds were explicitly mentioned, or whether a company 
that is known to offer mutual funds advertised an unrelated service, for example brokerage 
services or investment advice. For advertisements explicitly referring to mutual funds, I collected 
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data on whether the advertisement mentions past returns, whether these are absolute or relative 
returns, and whether the advertisement mentions the fund’s Morningstar or Lipper ratings. The 
only change in my methodology was that I did not keep a formal record of whether funds 
mentioned expenses, as the number was very close to zero. In the following analysis, I will deal 
only with advertisements in which mutual funds were explicitly mentioned, resulting in a data set 
of 473 advertisements.  
Data and Results 
 Again, the advertisements were aggregated into quarterly series then compared to S&P 
500 returns from the previous quarter. The results are summarized in Table 4. The first striking 
finding is that fewer JFP advertisements contain reference to returns than in Money: twenty 
percent as compared with thirty-nine percent. This difference is significant with p < .001. This is 
consistent with the prediction of greater rationality overall. As before, the share of 
advertisements presenting either absolute or relative returns was calculated in relation to only 
those advertisements containing reference to returns. Interestingly, though, the correlation 
coefficient on the JFP advertisements is negative and slightly significant, albeit weak. Thus, 
firms are more reluctant to advertise their returns when the stock market at large is performing 
well. This is likely due to firms’ anticipation of greater skepticism toward high returns when 
market returns are high, which would push funds to find other channels through which they can 
demonstrate their superior quality. This would seem to suggest that almost the reverse pattern is 
true for financial advisors as compared with casual investors: the central route to persuasion 
becomes even more effective on financial advisors when market returns as a whole have been 
high. This may be reassuring information for those who have entrusted their savings to the care 
of a financial planner.  
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Table 4: Summary of Journal of Financial Planning Results 
Returns  Share of Ads with Relative 65.53% 
Share of Ads with Returns 20.30% Correlation with S&P 500 0.039 
Correlation with S&P 500 -0.114* Ratings  
Relative vs. Absolute Returns  Share of Ads with Ratings 29.39% 
Share of Ads with Absolute 33.33% Correlation with S&P 500 -0.228*** 
Correlation with S&P 500 0.163**  
   * = p < .05 two-tailed, ** = p < .001 two-tailed, *** = p < .0001 two-tailed 
 
With regard to which type of returns funds choose to present, the data seem generally to 
be consistent with the predictions. The share of funds advertising absolute returns has a positive, 
but weak, coefficient, illustrating a similar procyclical pattern as that seen above in previous case. 
This seems to suggest that firms that believe absolute returns will be persuasive expect 
consumers to conform to the same Ir/Rational pattern observed with casual investors in Money. 
On the whole, firms seemed to prefer advertising relative returns, and did so in a manner that 
was not correlated with S&P 500 returns, which is consistent with the above predictions. It 
should be noted, though, that while a greater percent of advertisements contained relative returns 
in JFP compared with Money, the difference was not statistically significant. 
Finally, the data on ratings seem to be slightly ambiguous. Approximately the same share 
of mutual fund advertisements made reference to Morningstar and Lipper ratings between the 
two magazines, but each did so with a different pattern. In Money, ratings appeared procyclically, 
becoming more common as market returns rose. They had a moderate but significant correlation 
of 0.34 with the S&P 500. JFP, on the other hand, has a moderate and significant negative 
correlation of -0.228, illustrating that virtually the reverse pattern is true for this magazine. As 
with returns, this seems to suggest that centrally-oriented cues become even more effective for 
advertising to financial planners when overall market returns have been high. This may be the 
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case as firms need to do more to signal that their positive returns are due to high quality 
managers and not merely a general marketplace trend of stock prices rising.  
Discussion 
 In the second case, mutual fund advertisements from the Journal of Financial Planning 
were examined in order to see whether firms cater to more sophisticated investors by publishing 
more “rational” advertisements. The data seem largely supportive of this, as fewer 
advertisements present returns and those that do present returns favor relative over absolute. The 
correlations between each of these traits and the S&P 500 were substantially weaker and less 
statistically significant than in the Money example, indicating that advertisements tend to be 
more stable and less influenced by outside events, which is consistent with both the traditional 
economic theory and the model presented in this paper for individuals with a lower value of δ.  
The JFP data did, however, present two unexpected results: the data for both the share of 
advertisements with returns and the share with Morningstar and Lipper ratings had negative 
correlations with the S&P, which suggests that when market returns are high, the central route to 
persuasion becomes even more effective. As described above, this is likely due to increased 
difficulty in separating funds that had strong positive returns because of good management from 
poorly run funds simply showed good returns because overall market performance was strong. It 
may be the case that these two categories of funds, strongly and poorly managed, can be 
differentiated more easily during bear markets, although this question should be explored more 
thoroughly in future research. Future studies should also expand the data set to include more 
years and different forms of advertisements that target institutional investors. Additionally, since 
not every financial planner reads the JFP, the data may present some selection bias, against 
which future scholars should attempt to correct.  
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have presented a model of Ir/Rational Exuberance that describes mutual 
fund advertisements. Analysis of advertisements from Money and the Journal of Financial 
Planning seem to be largely supportive of the predictions from this model over the period from 
January 2003 –March 2009. More specifically, I have found that, for individuals with a higher 
level of δ (generally, casual investors), peripheral cues are more persuasive when market returns 
have been high. When market returns are low, central cues dominate, which may be due to both 
bad moods and the effects of learning. For individuals with a lower δ, the central route to 
persuasion generally prevails, but seems to become even more effective when market returns are 
high, implying that these individuals must analyze advertisements more critically in order to 
identify higher quality funds. 
These data are consistent with the results obtained by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2006). 
In that paper, the authors found that messages about returns prevail when the stock market has 
performed well, and signals suggesting that a fund has lower risk associated with it are more 
effective during a downturn. I found that, for individuals with a higher δ, signals about return—a 
peripheral cue—are more prominent when the market performs well. And, further, messages 
containing absolute returns were also preferred during this period, even though those are not 
considered informative by the traditional economic model. However, when market returns have 
been poor, messages about costs (which include excess risk borne) tend to be more persuasive, 
catering to investors’ central processing of persuasive messages.  
 This paper supports the argument that the traditional economic model of advertising is 
not by itself sufficient; however, I diverge from previous research by demonstrating that the 
traditional model plays a predictable role within the consumer thought process. The data 
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presented highlight certain periods in which investors—particularly casual investors—are more 
likely to misjudge the expected returns and costs of a given fund, and thus less likely to make a 
utility-maximizing decision. This occurs when things seem to be going well and the market is 
showing high returns. Fortunately, individuals can overcome this vulnerability in order to make 
more economically rational decisions, although this shift requires a negative experience which 
will either induce a bad mood or prompt learning. Investors should be educated about these 
patterns in order to guard themselves against exploitation by misleading advertisements. Doing 
so will move closer to the economic ideals of full information and rational behavior, both of 
which will result in a more efficient market for mutual funds.  
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